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EXPLORING APPLICATIONS OF
BLOCKCHAIN IN SECURING
ELECTRONIC MEDICAL RECORDS
BACH NGUYEN
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Summer of 2016, a hacker by the name of “thedarkoverlord” stole
over 650,000 medical records from the databases of three separate healthcare
institutions.1 The hacker was not only selling the records for hundreds of
thousands of dollars online,2 but may also have been extorting the institutions by
demanding money to prevent further attacks and distribution of records.3 The
value of these medical records is ten to sixty times greater than a credit card
number on the black market,4 as the information on the records may be used to
perpetrate other types of fraud5, such as filing fraudulent tax returns, making
these records a prime target for malicious hackers.6
Unfortunately, this is not an isolated or uncommon incident. In 2015, nearly
100 million healthcare records were compromised.7 The attacks affect everyone,
from everyday people to celebrities such as Kanye West.8 The combination of
the value of medical records and the relatively low cybersecurity of healthcare
facilities9 make healthcare records one of the most lucrative targets for
© 2017 Bach Nguyen.
1. Bradly Barth, Hacker Purportedly Selling Over 650,000 Stolen Medical Records on Dark Web
Marketplace, SC MAGAZINE, (Jun. 27, 2016), https://www.scmagazine.com/hacker-purportedly-sellingover-650000-stolen-medical-records-on-dark-web-marketplace/article/529296/.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Caroline Humer & Jim Finkle, Your Medical Record is Worth More to Hackers Than Your Credit
Card, REUTERS, (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cybersecurity-hospitalsidUSKCN0HJ21I20140924; Jennifer Schlesinger & Andrea Day, Dark Web is Fertile Ground for Stolen
Medical Records, CNBC, (Mar. 11, 2016), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/10/dark-web-is-fertile-groundfor-stolen-medical-records.html.
5. Humer & Finkle, supra note 4.
6. Jennifer Schlesinger & Andrea Day, Dark Web is Fertile Ground for Stolen Medical Records,
CNBC, (Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/10/dark-web-is-fertile-ground-for-stolenmedical-records.html.
7. Id.
8. Glenn Minnis, Kanye West Medical Records Stolen, Heads Set to Roll at UCLA Medical Center,
INQUISITR.COM, (Dec. 21, 2016), http://www.inquisitr.com/3815695/kanye-west-medical-records-stolenheads-set-to-roll-at-ucla-medical-center/.
9. Humer & Finkle, supra note 4.
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cybercriminals.10 According to the Department of Health and Human Services,
more than 113 million records were compromised in 2015, and during the first
quarter of 2016, the healthcare industry averaged 4 attacks per week.11 In fact,
the 2016 IBM Cyber Security Intelligence Index named the healthcare industry
the single most attacked industry.12 Efforts to modernize healthcare facilities to
match the rapidly advancing technological landscape has created and exposed a
host of vulnerabilities that are actively targeted by malicious parties.13
In the financial world, the rise of Bitcoin,14 a digital currency, and the
underlying technology, the blockchain, has upturned traditional notions of
banking and finance,15 capturing immense attention during its meteoric rise.16
For the creator of Bitcoin, the decentralized, tamper-proof system was the muchneeded alternative to centralized banking following the financial crisis of 2008.17
The blockchain is a data structure that uses cryptography to allow participants to
securely manipulate data without the need for a central authority.18 The
application of blockchain is not limited to Bitcoin, however, with many eager to
apply the technology to other areas, such as contracts and business with Etherium
and the DAO.19
There have been numerous calls to invest more into improving the state of
EMRs, including increased engagement between the public and private sector
and a more defined NIST framework to help providers secure their data.20 This
paper seeks to examine the potential applications of blockchain technology to the
10. Schlesinger & Day, supra note 6.
11. Nsikan Akpan, Has Health care Hacking Become an Epidemic?, PBS (Mar. 23, 2016)
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/has-health-care-hacking-become-an-epidemic/.
12. Expert Tells House Committee: “Healthcare Cybersecurity Is Worse Than Reported”,
BUSINESSWIRE (Apr. 5, 2017) http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20170405006088/en/.
13. Jonathan H. Lomurro, Electronic Medical Records: Changing Medical Malpractice Litigation,
300 N.J. LAW. 36, 37 (2016).
14. Bitcoin is a popular cryptocurrency, which is a digital currency with no central bank and instead
is managed by a decentralized network of computers which manage and maintain the transactions that
occur on the network. See infra § III. A.
15. Michael R. Gordon et al., Bitcoin to Blockchain: How Laws and Regulations Are Conforming to
and Impacting the Use of Virtual Currency, N.Y.C. B. ASS’N (Apr. 28, 2016), http://www.nycbar.org/cleofferings/if-i-were-a-virtually-rich-man-developments-in-the-laws-and-regulations-impacting-thedigital-currency-revolution/.
16. See Paul Vigna, For Bitcoin, A Year like No Other, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 31, 2017),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-bitcoin-a-year-like-no-other-1514721601.
17. Maria
Bustillos,
The
Bitcoin
Boom,
NEW
YORKER
(Apr.
1,
2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/the-bitcoin-boom.
18. Steven Norton, CIO Explaner: What Is Blockchain?, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 2, 2016),
http://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2016/02/02/cio-explainer-what-is-blockchain/.
19. See Joshua Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 WASH. & LEE
L.
REV.
ONLINE
35
(Sept.
2014),
http://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1003&context=wlulr-online
(Etherium is a cryptocurrency similar to Bitcoin. The DAO is a decentralized autonomous organization,
that takes its name from the concept from which it is derived).
20. Supra note 12.
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healthcare industry with the goal of securing and maintaining medical records.
First, the paper will examine the current state of the healthcare industry,
particularly the history and use of electronic medical records (“EMR”), the laws
and rules regulating the use of EMR, and the current state of security.21 Next, the
paper will discuss the blockchain, including its application in other contexts.22
Finally, the paper will analyze the possible applications of the blockchain to the
implementation and maintenance of EMR systems, potential security features to
accompany the implementation, and the feasibility of those applications.23
Overall, blockchain technology shows a great deal of promise for information
security, however further developments are necessary before it can be adopted
for electronic medical records.
II. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE OF ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORDS
The medical field has rapidly adopted new technology in recent decades,
from new instruments and tools to improve the care provided, to healthcare
information infrastructure and record storage.24 This shift towards EMR and
electronic health records (“EHR”) was a method of replacing cumbersome and
antiquated paper charts.25 The rapid adoption, did not adequately address security
concerns, leading to exploitable security concerns in an industry ill equipped to
deal with the demands of this new technology.26 To understand this situation, it
is important to take a closer look at how the current systems came into place.
A. History and State of Electronic Medical Records
Electronic records generally come in two forms: electronic medical records,
and electronic health records.27 EMR are an electronic version of traditional
paper medical charts, filled out and maintained by clinicians, which document

21. See infra Part II.
22. See infra Part III.
23. See infra Part IV.
24. See Wynne M. Snoots, Information Technology and the Medical Profession: A Curse or an
Opportunity?, BAYLOR UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER PROCEEDINGS, (Apr. 15, 2002),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1276501/.
25. Jonathan H. Lomurro, Electronic Medical Records: Changing Medical Malpractice Litigation,
300 N.J. LAW. 36, 37 (2016).
26. Lydia J. Andrasz, HIPAA and Electronic Medical Records: Benefits and Security Issues, 25
DCBA BRIEF 26, 29 (2012); Lori J. Strauss, Electronic Medical Records—Benefits and Liabilities,
Organizations Must Safeguard Against Risks When Using Electronic Medical Records, 17 J. HEALTH
CARE COMPLIANCE 57, 57-58 (2015); Niam Yaraghi, A Health Hack Wake-Up Call, USNEWS (Apr. 1,
2016), https://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/policy-dose/articles/2016-04-01/ransomware-hacks-area-hospital-health-it-wake-up-call.
27. What Are the Differences Between Electronic Medical Records, Electronic Health Records, and
Personal
Health
Records?,
HEALTHIT.GOV,
(last
updated
Nov.
2,
2015),
https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/faqs/what-are-differences-between-electronic-medicalrecords-electronic.
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the patient’s medical history and treatment.28 By contrast, EHR contains the
aforementioned information, in addition to information from all clinicians
involved with the patient’s care, providing a more comprehensive view of the
patient’s health.29 Both types of records are typically stored and managed locally
by the healthcare provider, where providers either purchase software from a
vendor, or create their own.30 While there were 632 certified vendors as of July
2016,31 the lion share of the market is covered by Epic Systems, servicing major
medical providers such as Kaiser Permanente, CVS’s Minute Clinics, and Johns
Hopkins, and covering 56% of Americans’ medical records.32
In 2004, the Bush administration heavily pushed the adoption of EMR and
EHR (herein referred to as “EMR”), with the goal of pushing most American
medical records to electronic systems capable also of sharing data between
providers and institutions, by 2014.33 The Obama administration continued with
this plan, introducing a five-year plan in 2009, which included financial
incentives for adoption and cuts to Medicare payments for non-adopters.34 Both
administrations saw this as a method of improving care and cutting costs.35 These
financial incentives increased enrollment astronomically, from 9.4% of US
hospitals using digital systems in 2008, to 75.5% in 2014, just six years later.36
Because of the rapid adoption, security concerns became a priority.37 The
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) issued regulations through
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”) Privacy
Rule, in 2000, and the HIPAA Security Rule, in 2003.38 These rules set standards
for information privacy, namely ensuring the security and integrity of patient

28. Lydia J. Andrasz, HIPAA and Electronic Medical Records: Benefits and Security Issues, 25
DCBA BRIEF 26, 26 (2012); see also What are the Differences Between Electronic Medical Records,
Electronic Health Records, and Personal Health Records?, HEALTHIT.GOV, (last updated Nov. 2, 2015),
https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/faqs/what-are-differences-between-electronic-medicalrecords-electronic; Strauss, supra note 26, at 57–58.
29. Andrasz supra note 28; see also What are the Differences Between Electronic Medical Records,
Electronic Health Records, and Personal Health Records?, HEALTHIT.GOV, (last updated Nov. 2, 2015),
https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/faqs/what-are-differences-between-electronic-medicalrecords-electronic.
30. Id.
31. Health
Care
Professional
EHR
Vendors,
HEALTHIT.GOV
(Jul.
2016)
https://dashboard.healthit.gov/quickstats/pages/FIG-Vendors-of-EHRs-to-ParticipatingProfessionals.php.
32. Patrick Caldwell, We’ve Spent Billions to Fix Our Medical Records and They’re Still a Mess.
Here’s Why, MOTHERJONES (Oct. 21, 2015), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2015/10/epicsystems-judith-faulkner-hitech-ehr-interoperability.
33. Andrasz supra note 28; see also Jonathan H. Lomurro, Electronic Medical Records: Changing
Medical Malpractice Litigation, 300 N.J. LAW. 36, 36–37 (2016).
34. See supra note 33.
35. Andrasz supra note 28.
36. See Caldwell, supra note 32.
37. See Andrasz, supra note 28; Strauss, supra note 28.
38. See Andrasz, supra note 28.
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information especially for EMRs.39 The Health Information Technology for
Economic and Clinical Health (“HITECH”) Act was enacted and became
effective in 2009, further enforcing these rules.40
Despite these efforts, vulnerabilities still exist in current systems, with tens
of millions of records having been lost or stolen since 2009.41 Hackers have
regularly been able to compromise the security of these healthcare providers,
whether they be state health departments, hospitals, or private practices.42 Each
provider is responsible for ensuring their system, whether they purchase a system
from a provider or create their own.43 The result is widespread inconsistencies in
security levels, as well as difficulty communicating across platforms and
between providers.44 To further complicate issues, some providers like Epic have
made it more difficult for their system to communicate with other systems.45
perhaps in an attempt to avoid compromising information to less secure systems
or in an effort to lock its providers in its own ecosystem. Cybersecurity is aptly
called an arms race between security experts and hackers, and inconsistencies
across systems create exploitable vulnerabilities with catastrophic
consequences.46
B. HIPAA Privacy Rule and “Break-the-Glass” Procedure
There are a few laws that address security issues regarding healthcare
information and medical records. Most relevant to EMR are HIPAA and the
HITECH act. “Congress enacted HIPAA on August 21, 1996 to ‘improve
portability and continuity of health insurance coverage in the group and
individual markets, to combat waste, fraud, and abuse in health insurance and
health care delivery, to promote the use of medical savings accounts, to improve
access to long–term care services and coverage, to simplify the administration of

39. Id.
40. See Andrasz, supra note 28; Lomurro, supra note 33.
41. See Andrasz, supra note 28.
42. See id.
43. See Andrasz, supra note 28; What Security Safeguards are Designed to Prevent Electronic Health
Records
from
being
Hacked?,
HEALTHIT.GOV,
(last
updated
Jan.
15,
2013),
https://www.healthit.gov/patients-families/faqs/what-security-safeguards-are-designed-preventelectronic-health-records-being.
44. See Health Information Privacy, Security, and Your EHR, HEALTHIT.GOV, (last updated Apr. 13,
2015), https://www.healthit.gov/providers-professionals/ehr-privacy-security; Leon Rodriguez, Privacy,
Security,
and
Electronic
Health
Records,
HEALTHIT.GOV,
(Dec.
12,
2011),
https://www.healthit.gov/buzz-blog/privacy-and-security-of-ehrs/privacy-security-electronic-healthrecords/; Andrasz supra note 28.
45. See Caldwell, supra note 32.
46. See Max Taves, How Fear and Self-Preservation Are Driving a Cyber Arms Race, CNET.COM,
(May 2, 2015), https://www.cnet.com/news/how-fear-and-self-preservation-are-driving-a-cyber-armsrace/.

104

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

[VOL. 20:099

health insurance, and for other purposes.’”47 Additionally, Congress instructed
HHS to provide recommended standards for the privacy of personal health
information.48 The “Privacy Rule” was promulgated in 2001, allowed 2-3 years
for covered entities, including health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and most
healthcare providers, to come into compliance with the rule.49 In general, the rule
defines and limits the ability for covered entities to access patient health
information, and also guarantees patients to access his or her own information.50
Following initiatives to incorporate technology into healthcare,51 the
HITECH Act was signed into law in 2009.52 In addition to promoting the use of
EMR, the Act also greatly emphasized the importance of information privacy
and security by enforcing the prior HIPAA rules.53
On the opposite end of the increased privacy and security protections are
“break-the-glass” procedures. “Break-the-glass”—or “break glass”—procedures
are mechanisms to provide access of personal health information to otherwise
non-authorized parties in the event of an emergency.54 Examples of where “break
glass” procedures may be necessary range from a mundane forgotten password
or username, to more extreme situations where a provider who otherwise does
not have access to a particular patient’s records is nonetheless thrust into an
emergency medical situation where access to the patient’s information is
necessary for treatment.55 One common solution is to use a generic “emergency”
user account that enables access to otherwise restricted personal health
information, where access to the user account is overseen by some reasonable
administrative measures.56 Use of the account is also subject to audit, further
minimizing risk of abuse through reprimand.57
C. The Current Security Protocol for Healthcare Systems
The HIPAA “Security Rule” requires “specific measures to safeguard
[patients’] electronic protected health information to ensure its confidentiality,

47. Deborah F. Buckman, Validity, Construction, and Application of Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and Regulations Promulgated Thereunder, 194 A.L.R. Fed. 133,
§2 (Originally published in 2004); See also Andrasz, supra note 28.
48. Buckman supra note 47; see also Andrasz, supra note 28.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See supra Part II.A.; see also Andrasz, supra note 28.
52. See Andrasz, supra note 28.
53. Id.
54. Break Glass Procedure: Granting Emergency Access to Critical ePHI Systems, YALE.EDU, (Dec.
2004),
http://hipaa.yale.edu/security/break-glass-procedure-granting-emergency-access-critical-ephisystems.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
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integrity, and security.”58 Beyond that, however, the statute does not offer much
guidance, suggesting features including “access controls” such as passwords or
encryption.59 The specifics are largely left to the provider and their capabilities
and budget, which is the reason why there are such broad discrepancies in
security across the healthcare industry.60 Where cybersecurity is a fast moving
field, this means many providers may be operating on outdated software, leaving
vulnerabilities especially exposed.61 As of July 2016, 75% of providers using
certified technology were still using technology that met HHS’s 2014
certification requirements, where the remaining providers were still using 2011
certified technology.62 This does not include providers that are using uncertified
technology, or none at all.63 Given the current state of healthcare cybersecurity,
it is clear that far more needs to be done to secure patient information.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF THE BLOCKCHAIN
A blockchain, a technology originally developed with Bitcoin64, is a peerto-peer network where each computer in the network verifies and records every
transaction on the network, and transactions are only recorded on the ledger once
the network confirms the validity of the transaction, thus preventing third party
manipulation and streamlining the record.65 Every modification to the ledger is
autonomously reviewed and verified against the ledger recorded on each
computer in the network, so if there is an illegitimate change on any single
computer, or node, in the network, the change is invalid and will not be
recorded.66
. Imagine a single parent preparing a grocery list. This parent has a child
with a particular affinity for sweets. As a comparison to a traditional computer
58. What Security Safeguards are Designed to Prevent Electronic Health Records from being
Hacked?, supra note 43.
59. Id.
60. See supra Part II.A.
61. See Feisal Nanji, Security Challenges of Electronic Medical Records, COMPUTERWORLD.COM
(Feb. 9, 2009), http://www.computerworld.com/article/2531320/security0/security-challenges-ofelectronic-medical-records.html (discussing vulnerabilities in modern health systems, including having
equipment with inadequate protection, and having equipment connected to the web for convenience,
leaving that equipment vulnerable to attack).
62. HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONAL EHR VENDORS,
HEALTHIT.GOV (Jul.
2016)
https://dashboard.healthit.gov/quickstats/pages/FIG-Vendors-of-EHRs-to-ParticipatingProfessionals.php.
63. Id.
64. Bitcoin is a popular cryptocurrency, which is a digital currency with no central bank and instead
is managed by a decentralized network of computers which manage and maintain the transactions that
occur on the network. See infra Part III.A.
65. Nicolette De Sevres, Bart Chilton & Bradley Cohen, The Blockchain Revolution, Smart Contracts
and Financial Transactions, 21 CYBERSPACE LAW. NL 3, 3 (2016).
66. Michele D’Aliessi, How Does the Blockchain Work?, MEDIUM (Jun. 1, 2016),
https://medium.com/@micheledaliessi/how-does-the-blockchain-work-98c8cd01d2ae.
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system, suppose the parent writes his grocery list and leaves the list on the
refrigerator to take to the store at a later date.67 Also suppose the parent
periodically revises the list, crossing off unnecessary items and adding new
items.68 Knowing this, the child can then go to the refrigerator and modify the
grocery list to include her favorite sweets or exclude her least favorite foods.69
Assuming the child is skillful in her modifications, the handwriting for the
changes would be indistinguishable from the parent’s, and the parent could go
on to buy items according to the modified list, and not according to the untampered, accurate list.70 Because the parent is prone to revising the list, even if
a modification was detected, it would be difficult to distinguish a legitimate
modification (made by the parent) from an illegitimate modification (made by
the child).71 Additionally, even supposing there was a record of each iteration of
the list, it would be difficult to isolate exactly when the illegitimate modification
occurred without additional information, and so it would be difficult to revert to
the most recent legitimate form of the list.72 The parent could revert to the first
iteration of the list, thus guaranteeing that no modifications have been made, but
this risks losing all the legitimate modifications the parent made at later dates.73
The parent could revert the list to a more recent version of the list, but it would
be difficult to be certain that this eliminated the illegitimate modifications, as the
child may have made the modification in an earlier version. This is analogous to
many modern information storage systems, where information is stored at a
single location, so if an attacker is able to access the system and modify the
information undetected (such that, to the system, the attacker is indistinguishable
from a legitimate user), it becomes very difficult to identify and reverse the
illegitimate modification without either losing valuable data or risking not
eliminating the modification.74 Most modern cybersecurity measures revolve
around developing more sophisticated methods of detecting and reversing
unauthorized access or developing more secure methods of granting and denying
access, resulting in a race with attackers who develop more sophisticated means
of bypassing these security features.75
The blockchain takes a different approach to solving this problem.
Continuing with the analogy, suppose the parent instead keeps multiple copies
of the list around the house and other locations, such in his car and on his cell
phone. Instead of maintaining the list in series, that is, keeping copies of each

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

See generally Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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iteration of the list, the lists themselves self-maintain in parallel, meaning
whenever the parent legitimately modifies one list, every other list verifies the
authenticity of this modification and updates to reflect the change.76 Suppose the
child now were to illegitimately modify the list on the refrigerator; the parent
would easily be able to discover not only that this particular list was modified,
but also what was modified by comparing the list to every other list.77 This allows
the parent to correct the list, and also to evaluate flaws with that particular list.78
An important conceptual point is that there is no master grocery list.79 The parent
is not modifying one list and then merely copying the information from that list
onto every other list as, the child could then identify which list was the master
list, modify that list, resulting in the parent copying that information onto every
other list. Instead, each list is equally legitimate, therefore the child would have
to modify every list in the network of lists without being detected, which is far
more difficult to accomplish than modifying one list.80
While the process of simultaneously updating lists may be difficult for a
single parent to accomplish, the task is far easier for a computer network, where
each computer in the network contains a “list” and can go through the updating
and verification process without a centralized “parent” figure.81 More accurately,
each “list” or system containing the “list” is able to self-monitor and regulate
modifications, and verify the modifications independent of a third party, such as
the parent or the child, making the network peer-to-peer, where each peer is a
“list” or system containing the “list.”82 This is the key difference that makes
networks and systems operating with a blockchain structure far more difficult to
tamper with and modify without authorization.83
A. Bitcoin and Other Applications of Blockchain
For Bitcoin and similar cryptocurrencies, blockchain is used as a ledger to
record transactions.84 The basic set-up is such: there is a network of computers
on which this ledger exists.85 When an individual makes a purchase using
Bitcoin, that transaction occurs instantaneously across two nodes, or “blocks,” in
the network, or “chain.”86 Because the transaction occurred across two nodes at
the exact same time, there was a legitimate exchange, and this transaction is
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Norton, supra note 18.
See generally How Does Bitcoin Work?, BITCOIN.ORG, https://bitcoin.org/en/how-it-works.
See generally id.
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recorded on the ledger of every computer in the network in an updating process.87
On the other hand, if the ledger on one node changes without any others, as is
the case when a hacker makes a unilateral change on one node, the change is
cross-referenced with every other system in the network, and because the ledgers
no longer match, the change is illegitimate and is undone.88 The verification
process is completed through “mining,” an autonomous process where
computers in the network “donate” computing power used to verify
transactions.89 As compensation and incentive, “miners” generate new Bitcoin
(at very low rates to avoid inflation), which stimulates the Bitcoin economy and
facilitates further transactions.90
Another notable application of blockchain is in “The DAO.” “The DAO”
(not to be confused with a decentralized autonomous organization, of which “The
DAO” is one, and from which “The DAO” takes its name) is a collection of smart
contracts built on the Ethereum blockchain, which sets the rules for and collects
money from investors and invest that money based on how the investors vote.91
“The DAO” operates on Ethereum, a decentralized cryptocurrency similar
to Bitcoin, but, which can run smart contracts.92 A smart contract is created by
encoding the terms of a traditional contract and uploading the smart contract to
the blockchain.93 “Contractual clauses are automatically executed when preprogrammed conditions are satisfied,” and because the transactions are
monitored, validated, and enforced by the blockchain, there is no need for a
trusted third party, such as an escrow agent.94 “Where a smart contract’s
conditions depend upon real-world data (e.g., the price of a commodity future at
a given time), agreed-upon outside systems, called oracles, can be developed to
monitor and verify prices, performance, or other real-world events.”95
“A standard DAO framework has been written by Slock it and can be found
on its GitHub. This framework is written. . .to run on the Ethereum blockchain.
It has been developed free and open source, so everyone can reuse it to create its

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Michael del Castillo, The DAO: Or How A Leaderless Ethereum Project Raised $50 Million,
COINDESK.COM, (May 12, 2016), http://www.coindesk.com/the-dao-just-raised-50-million-but-what-isit/.
92. Rob Price, A 3-Minute Guide to Ethereum, the Crazy Digital Currency that was Just Rocked by
a $50 Million Hack, BUS, INSIDER, (Jun. 17, 2016), http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-ethereumdecentralised-digital-currency-hit-by-50-million-hack-the-dao-smart-contracts-hard-fork-20166?r=UK&IR=T.
93. De Sevres et al., supra note 65.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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own Decentralized Autonomous Organization.”96 Slock.it is a for-profit
company registered in Germany, which developed the basic framework for a
DAO blockchain.97 The project is open-source, which means that anyone can
access and change the framework. However, “The DAO” runs on a particular
client or version, which is downloaded by members,98 where users on a different
or modified version are limited or unable to communicate with users on the main
distribution.99
There have been multiple other explorations and proposals for the
capabilities that blockchain offers, generally leveraging the tamper-proof nature
of the ledger or the decentralized and peer-to-peer characteristics of the
technology, notably in the works of Joshua Fairfield, Victor Li, Tom Bell, Nick
Vogel, and Michael Abramowicz.100
B. Blockchain and Privacy
While blockchain technology is very effective at facilitating and
maintaining records for peer-to-peer, tamper-proof transactions, it is not innately
designed with information privacy in mind.101 Being fundamentally open, a basic
blockchain allows anyone on the network to read the contents on the network;102
the writing or modification process is what is secured.103 Returning briefly to the
grocery list analogy, the child is able to read what is on the grocery list without
much issue, but has far more difficulty modifying the grocery list without
detection.
There have been a number of recent projects aimed at utilizing blockchain
technology to secure privacy. Mooti CEO Brad Chun recently unveiled the
company’s first project, Mootipass, which provides a cryptographic
96. What
is
the
DAO?,
THEDAOWIKI,
(last
updated
Jun.
29,
2016),
https://daowiki.atlassian.net/wiki/display/DAO/Introduction+to+the+DAO; see also Castillo, supra note
91.
97. The DAO Framework, Slock.it FAQ, SLOCK.IT, https://slock.it/index.html.
98. Vitalik Buterin, Onward from the Hard Fork, ETHERIUM.ORG, (Jul. 26, 2016),
https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/07/26/onward_from_the_hard_fork/.
99. Id.
100. Michael Abramowicz, Cryptocurrency-Based Law, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 359, (2016) (discussing
numerous applications for blockchain); Michael Abramowicz, Cryptoinsurance, 50 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 671 (2015) (discussing applications for insurance); Tom Bell, Copyrights, Privacy, and the
Blockchain, 42 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 439 (2016) (discussing applications for copyright and privacy);
Fairfield, supra note 19; Joshua Fairfield, Bitproperty, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 805 (May, 2015) (discussing
applications for property records); Victor Li, Bitcoin’s Useful Backbone, 102 A.B.A. J. 31 (Mar. 2016)
(discussing applications for private record keeping); Nick Vogel, The Great Decentralization: How Web
3.0 will Weaken Copyrights, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 136 (2015) (discussing consequences
for copyright law).
101. See Vitalik Buterin, Privacy on the Blockchain, ETHERIUM.ORG (Jan. 15, 2016)
https://blog.ethereum.org/2016/01/15/privacy-on-the-blockchain/.
102. D’Aliessi, supra note 66.
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identification and validation service.104 The service uses technology developed
by the company,105 called “Identity Chains,” which builds off of blockchain
technology to allow for identification without divulging personal information.106
Customers could entrust their personal information to the company, which would
then secure the personal information using cryptography across a blockchain,
and then provide only as much information as necessary to other vendors to
verify the customer’s identity.107 For example, if bank asks whether a customer
is old enough to open an account, Mooti could confirm that the customer was of
age without revealing the customer’s exact age.108 Other companies, such as tech
giant Microsoft, have also been working on blockchain based identity systems.109
Another project from bitcoin experts and researchers at MIT, dubbed
Enigma, was revealed in June of 2015,110 tackles the problem differently. The
technique, called “secure multiparty computation,” is a method of encryption that
divides data into hundreds of indecipherable chunks and distributes those chunks
randomly across hundreds of computers in the network.111 Computations can be
performed on the chunks of data without revealing the contents of the data to
external observers or even the computers performing the computations.112 The
Enigma network also stores the record of who owns the data on a blockchain,
where the owner can reassemble the pieces of data in order to decrypt the
information.113 Only when all the pieces are assembled correctly can the data be
read; this allows data to be shared online while still keeping the data private.114
By utilizing the blockchain, Enigma is able to perform encrypted computation at
several orders of magnitude faster than previous encryption schemes, though still
ten to a hundred times slower than performing the computation without
encryption.115 Additionally, as with all computations on blockchain, the system
requires a fairly large network to operate, and the security of the system increases
with the number of computers in the network, but the speed decreases with the

104. Brady Dale, Microsoft and Mootipass Bet Identity could be Blockchains’ Killer App,
OBSERVER.COM, (Aug. 18, 2016), http://observer.com/2016/08/mootipass-blockchain-identity-bradchun/; See also MOOTIPASS.COM, http://mootipass.com/.
105. Dale, supra note 104.
106. Andrew Egbert et al., Identity Chains, IACR.ORG, https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/469.pdf (last
visited Jan. 1, 2018).
107. Dale, supra note 104.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Andy Greenberg, MIT’s Bitcoin Inspired ‘Enigma’ Lets Computers Mine Encrypted Data,
WIRED.COM, (Jun. 30, 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/06/mits-bitcoin-inspired-enigma-letscomputers-mine-encrypted-data/.
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increasing size of the network.116 Both Mooti and Enigma are still in early stages
of development, however, and still need to be completed and tested.117
Another security measure is multi-factor authentication.118 This security
measure has already been offered by popular services such as Google and
Facebook since 2011, requiring both a password and a security code sent to the
account owner’s cell phone in order to log in.119 This principle is more flexible,
and generally revolves around authentication using two or more different
verification methods, commonly referred to by “something you know (such as a
password), something you have (a trusted device that is not easily duplicated,
like a phone), something you are (biometrics [such as a fingerprint]).”120
Securing information through this extra level makes it far more difficult for
unauthorized attackers to access an account.121 . For example, if an attacker
acquires a patient’s password through a computer scam, phishing, or other
method, it is unlikely that they are also able to steal a physical object from the
patient, and furthermore acquire the patient’s fingerprint.122 Where blockchain
typically is secured by a private cryptographic key known only to the owner,123
a multi step authentication process could further secure the owner’s information.
IV. APPLICATION OF BLOCKCHAIN TO ELECTRONIC MEDICAL RECORDS
Given the dynamic uses of blockchain technology, EMR can utilize the
technology in several ways to increase security. One method is similar to the
model presented by Mooti, where data is stored securely on the blockchain, and
access to that information is granted as necessary to authorized parties.124 A
second method is similar to Enigma, where the entire medical record, including
private information, is distributed in cryptic chunks across a network and is only
assembled and decrypted for the owner.125 Both models provide advantages and
present challenges, however, as technology advances, both show promise for the
future of medical record security.
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117. Dale, supra note 104; Greenberg, supra note 110.
118. Kelly Gremban et al., What is Azure Multi-Factor Authentication?, MICROSOFT AZURE, (Dec. 8,
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More, PCWORLD, (Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2036252/how-to-set-up-two-factorauthentication-for-facebook-google-microsoft-and-more.html.
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A. EMR Using the Mooti Model
Using a service similar to Mooti, a patient’s health record could be held
securely on a blockchain network.126 Upon visiting a healthcare center, the
patient could verify her identity, allowing the physician to access the patient’s
medical record.127 Further security measures could require the patient to perform
a multi-step authentication,128 which could take many forms including using the
patient’s health information that is already on record as a method of identity
verification. Additionally, given the current proliferation of fingerprint scanners
on smartphones and other devices, there are many different avenues to pursue in
implementing multi factor authentication.129 This way, access to the patient’s
information is limited where the patient is not present. A concern is that the
service too strictly regulates the information to which the physician has access,
where a physician should be granted broad access to the patient’s medical record
to consider potential health conflicts and interactions between treatments and
conditions, and to work on the patient’s case where the patient is not present.
A nuance of HIPAA worth noting is that de-identified health information is
not covered by the Act.130 What this means is that the health information and
personally identifiable information can be provided separately.131 Using a similar
service as Mooti, personally identifiable information may be provided separately
to a full medical record, or not provided at all and merely used to verify the
identity of the patient and grant access to the medical record.132 The fact that deidentified health information is not covered by HIPAA also means that
physicians may still work on a patient’s case without the patient’s presence by
merely working with the de-identified file.133 This file would still be protected
from tampering thanks to the blockchain, and the personal information would be
even more secured from unauthorized viewers by the service.134
One major difficulty arises with “break glass” procedures. Due to the
increased security measures, access to health information in emergency
126. See supra Part III.B.
127. See supra Part III.B.
128. See supra Part III.B.
129. See Gremban et al., supra note 118.
130. Buckman supra note 47.
131. Id.
132. Buckman supra note 47; Dale, supra note 104.
133. See Buckman, supra note 47 (Encryption can be realized in several different ways to achieve
security; one additional way worth further exploration is utilization of the patient’s personally identifiable
information to generate a security key that would link the protected, personally identifiable information
with the non-protected medical history. In separating the personally identifiable information with the
medical information, EMR providers would be able to hold the personal information in strict protection,
while allowing more ease of access to the medical information to which physicians need more immediate
access. In a similar model as Mootipass, the record could simply verify the identity of the patient without
revealing more sensitive personal information that is not relevant to the practice of medicine, allowing
physicians to perform their duties.); Dale, supra note 104.
134. Id.
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situations may become prohibitively difficult.135 Emergency situations may arise
where patients are unable to provide the necessary multi-factor authorization, in
which case some remedial procedure would need to be available.136 A simple
solution would be to scrap the multi-factor authentication and verification,
however this invites abuse and unnecessarily sacrifices security for the sake of
convenience and accessibility.137 Reintroduction of an auditing process could
dissuade abuse and encourage diligence,138 and could operate in conjunction with
proactive measures to maintain security and privacy. In a “break glass” situation,
the authentication requirements could be relaxed in proportion to the
circumstances. Because the current system requires at least some personally
identifiable information to retrieve the relevant medical records,139 that
information could be the basis of a “break glass” authentication. In fact, having
a multi-factor authentication scheme in place allows for alternative avenues for
“break glass” authentication, for example if a patient does not have identification
but is still able to provide a fingerprint, or vice versa. Certain aspects of a
patient’s medical record, such as dental records or DNA information, can be
incorporated into a remedial, “break glass” multi-factor authentication scheme
in order to provide multiple, robust avenues for emergency situations.140
One criticism of the Mooti model is that the information is still somewhat
centralized, where the Mooti service serves as a gatekeeper, and a successful
attack on the service could reveal information that would compromise all the
patients served by the service.141 The second option of the Enigma model
provides a more decentralized system, and may be able to leverage more of the
security provided by blockchain.
B. EMR Using the Enigma Model
Under an Enigma-style service, the patient’s entire medical record would
be divided and distributed in cryptographically secured chunks of data, which
could be reassembled and decrypted with proper authentication.142 Although
there is the option of having the patient authenticate an interaction using a
personal device interfacing with the provider’s device, this would disadvantage
patients who either do not use or do not have access to a portable computer or
135. See Break Glass Procedure: Granting Emergency Access to Critical ePHI Systems, YALE.EDU,
(Dec. 2004), http://hipaa.yale.edu/security/break-glass-procedure-granting-emergency-access-criticalephi-systems.
136. See id.
137. Wawro, supra note 119.
138. Break Glass Procedure: Granting Emergency Access to Critical ePHI Systems, supra note 135;
Rodriguez, supra note 44.
139. Id.
140. See Gremban et al., supra note 118.
141. See generally Dale, supra note 104.
142. See supra Part III.B.
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smartphone. A more elegant solution, therefore, would be to use multi-factor
authentication.143 Having a similar security protocol for the physician would
ensure that the patient’s file could only be accessed and modified by the
authorized physician.144 Similar to the discussion of the Mooti system above,
information could also be separated such that the patient’s authentication only
allows access to the medical record, and no personally identifiable information.
The personally identifiable information could remain encrypted in the way
Enigma allows where no outside party nor the computer could access the
information.145
Another benefit of blockchain worth noting is that the peer-to-peer
capabilities would allow physicians to collaborate in determining the best course
of treatment for a patient. Similar to the voting process on “The DAO,”146
physicians collaborating on a case could offer their medical judgment in a fast
and reliable way. Furthermore, the autonomous programs could present patient
information devoid of any personally identifiable information, such that it would
be a simple matter of sharing the patient’s condition without violating HIPAA.147
This would make it a simple task to obtain a second opinion, should the patient
or physician seek a second opinion.148
One drawback of the Enigma system in comparison to existing databases is
speed.149 In some medical contexts, minor delays may not be a concern, however
in emergency “break-the-glass” situations, the time taken to decrypt the
information may be intolerable. While the speed of the system is improving,150
the delay is nonetheless a factor worth scrutiny when evaluating the viability of
the system.
C. Other Considerations
Blockchain technology as a whole is relatively new, and remains in
testing.151 As with any new technology, caution must be taken, especially when
valuable information is at stake.152 Additionally, the technology remains very
demanding both in terms of computing power and raw energy investment,153 and
143. See supra Part III.B.
144. See supra Part III.B.
145. See supra Part III.B.
146. See Castillo, supra note 91(“anyone around the world who has bought DAO tokens with ethers—
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hospital systems may be hesitant to invest so heavily into a security system,
especially where many hospitals currently struggle to pay for existing, less
elaborate security systems.154
V. CONCLUSION
Security and privacy remain a massive concern for the healthcare industry.
While blockchain technology is still in development and undergoing testing,
many recent developments show a great deal of promise in terms of securing
information and valuable data. Data breaches have only become more severe as
technology has advanced, and with the current organization of security solutions,
this trend seems unlikely to change in meaningful ways. With blockchain comes
a fundamental reorganization of how data is stored and secured, and is worth
serious consideration as medical providers and security experts look for solutions
to secure patient information.

154. Nanji, supra note 61.

